To “adapt” implies building specific resources and capabilities that previously did not exist. For example, a current client is trying to move from a hardware-sales focus to a “solution-provider”. They need to design solutions for distinct markets they serve (a solution = the hardware + control systems + ongoing support). Creating these solutions is a capability they currently do not have. Nor do they have the people (in sales, design, project mgmt) to start developing that capability.

We can specify not only the numbers of such people needed, but also the rate at which they can be hired or developed, the rate at which *they* can then build solutions, the numbers of potential customers those solutions can be sold to, the rate at which those potential customers can be developed, and thus how costs, sales and profits can grow over time – to get to a cash-flow forecast from this strategic initiative.

The first is easily dealt with – stronger cash flow ‘growth’ than rivals can of course imply less decline when everyone is going backwards .. would you rather cash-flows fell by 50% or only 20%? We just need to add the check that this is sustainable – as I have argued with the Starbucks case, slashing costs to sustain immediate cash-flows [and support ROIC] is hardly welcome if it damages future cash flow.

I find the second response intriguing – that strategic management is all about survival, and anything extra management may achieve is just a welcome bonus. First, this does not seem to have been the primary concern of CEOs for most firms during reasonable economic conditions [at least after the high infant mortality of start-up!]. Maybe it should have been.

But there’s a bigger question as to whether survival should be the aim in any case. It is easy to see situations in which it would be in everyone’s interests for a firm not to survive, but to be acquired – both in positive and negative circumstances.

• In my time practising strategy, we constantly sought out promising smaller businesses to acquire and develop. This was good for their owners, who got good cash returns for their investment – good for customers, who got faster and wider access to the good products and services of those businesses – good for employees, who got more job and career opportunities – good for suppliers, who got a stronger, faster-growing  customer to supply – good for their management, who often had access to bigger jobs or else also left with a nice cash handout. Apart from competitors, I can’t think of any group who suffered. Indeed, many smaller businesses start up with the deliberate intent of being acquired in this way. For a big-scale example of a serial-acquiror who has exploited this phenomenon, it’s worth checking out Cisco – here’s an interview with their head of business development and just one case study on the story .. you will find a ton more case studies at European Case Clearing House.
• It’s not even clear that death necessarily does harm when it’s the final outcome of business failure. If death = acquisition by another company, investors can get value that would otherwise have disappeared, customers can get continued provision of products and services that may otherwise have discontinued, suppliers get a continuing sales opportunity, and employees get the chance of a continued job rather than redundancy.

Unfortunately, even when others would benefit hugely from a business being absorbed by another, one small group likely to suffer unfortunately dominates whether it happens or not – management themselves. So I find myself wondering how many firms are currently strugging to survive when it would be best if management spent their time seeking a buyer instead.

The only form of survival I can see that might be a reasonable aim for strategic management is the avoidance of bankruptcy – but that’s the extreme case, and responsible management should be able to find better solutions in almost all cases, well before that becomes unavoidable.

” …

Have had many useful answers on this. There seems little dissent that:

• we have a problem with current strategy methods not being valued by the people who are supposed to use them,

• … which implies we have little useful theory [notably that seeking explanations for profitability is the wrong question], and
• existing strategy tools focus on the rare issue of choosing strategic position, rather than what management actually does to steer strategy and performance continually through time.

If this is all about right, perhaps any firm’s ‘sustained competitive advantage’  shows up not in persistent higher profitability, but in stronger sustained growth in cash-flows. Perhaps this implies that the question strategy should be asking [in business cases at least] is ‘what does management actually do to deliver sustained growth of cash flows ahead of others?’ On this measure, performance of strong firms might be tens or hundreds of times greater than that of weaker ones, so an answer would seem to be of more interest to our customers .. executives, consultants, students .. than a few percentage points of ROIC or ‘rent’.
It would be useful to hear more from the senior figures in the strategy field as to whether this is all way off-target – I would not want to stand accused of encouraging colleagues down a long, deep and dark blind alley. Maybe there is no problem with the reputation of Strategy in its market-place, with basic strategy theory, or with the utility of the tools and methods that are recommended and taught?

…”

Kim